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Notes
LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF
URINALYSIS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute
authority over their students. Students in school as well as
out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
State.1
I. INTRODUCTION
As freshman Guy Good sits in his fourth period Spanish class at
Garrison High School on the first day of school, his nerves have settled
and he is excited about the various opportunities his school has to offer.2
Like many high school freshmen, he is insecure about his developing
body and is often uncomfortable in social settings. Unlike many of his
peers, Guy has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder, for which he takes Ritalin on a daily basis. Guy is frustrated
by his disorder, but understands that he needs to take Ritalin to function
productively and concentrate in school. Because he is self-conscious
about his condition, Guy and his parents decided that they would keep
this medical information confidential.
Ten minutes before the bell is due to ring for fifth period, the
principal enters the class and demands that Guy follow him to his office.
Guy is embarrassed by being singled out in front of his classmates, but
knows that he has never caused any trouble. Still, he breaks into a
nervous sweat when he hears the principal announce his name in front
of the class.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
The school and people described in this hypothetical are fictional. However, the
hypothetical school policy bears a close resemblance to those challenged in Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002), Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995), and
Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 931 (N.D. Tex. 2001). See infra Part
II.C (discussing these cases).
1
2
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Unbeknownst to Guy and his parents, over the summer, the school
district implemented a random drug testing program and he is one of the
students who has been selected. He is led to the restroom where the
principal hovers behind him and demands that he produce a urine
sample for testing and disclose any medications he is currently taking.
Guy’s face turns pale and his mouth goes dry. With no choice, he
produces the sample, reveals his Ritalin prescription, and leaves the
principal’s office feeling violated.
Following recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment’s application to public school children, random
suspicionless drug testing, like that at Garrison High School, has become
a reality in American schools. This Note will address the constitutional
boundaries of suspicionless drug testing for Guy and other students in
public schools who may be subjected to such privacy concerns.
In doing so, Part II will first provide background information
describing the structure of the Fourth Amendment and how it has been
applied to the states, particularly in the public school setting.3 Part II.B
will then introduce the “special needs” doctrine that the Court has
created, which has allowed the government to circumvent the warrant
and probable cause provisions of the Fourth Amendment.4
In
addressing how the Fourth Amendment has been applied in the school
environment, Part II.C will generally discuss the diminished
constitutional rights afforded to students and how these rights differ
from those of adult citizens.5
Next, Part III of this Note will discuss how these decisions
establishing diminished rights have paved the way for school districts to
implement suspicionless drug testing for all students enrolled in public
school.6 Part III will also examine the policies that have recently been
implemented by school districts and how the Court might apply its
previous decisions in determining their constitutionality.7 Finally, Part
IV will propose a new test, which factors in the rights of the students’

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B. While the “special needs” doctrine has traditionally been applied to
criminal contexts, this Note will discuss how the Supreme Court has recently applied it to
non-criminal conduct, particularly in the public school setting.
5
See infra Part II.C.
6
See infra Part III.
7
Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 919. In this case, the school district’s drug testing policy
was held to be unconstitutional after applying the balancing test that was implemented by
the Court in Vernonia. Id. at 930; see infra Part IV.
3
4
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parents, for courts to apply when addressing the privacy rights of
students in public schools.8
II. BACKGROUND
To properly analyze the issue of suspicionless drug testing in public
schools, Part II will discuss prior Supreme Court decisions that have led
to the gradual erosion of the language of the Constitution and students’
constitutional rights. Part II.A will first explore the text of the Fourth
Amendment and its subsequent interpretation by the Court.9 Next, Part
II.B will discuss the special needs doctrine that the Court has used to
circumvent the language of the Fourth Amendment.10 Lastly, this Part
will interpret how the Court has applied the special needs doctrine in
public schools.11
While the Supreme Court has held that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,” it has also held that
students’ expectations of privacy are not the same as those of adults.12 In
the face of the national “War on Drugs,” the Supreme Court held school
policies implementing mandatory suspicionless drug testing for high
school students to be constitutional despite the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.13

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A.
10
See infra Part II.B. The Court has applied the special needs doctrine in the school
setting and in government employment positions where safety is of great concern. See
generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
11
See infra Part II.B. The Court has conclusively held that schools are to be considered
state actors in regard to the Fourth Amendment, stating:
If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to
understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental
rather than public authority when conducting searches of their
students.
New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
12
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). But see
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (holding that “Fourth Amendment
rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot
disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children”); T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 340 (“The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit
activity needed to justify a search. . . . [I]n certain limited circumstances neither [probable
cause nor the requirement of a warrant] is required.”).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
8
9
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In the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, school districts across
the country have implemented drug testing policies that expand their
reach to students who are involved in extracurricular activities or who
drive to school, or even in some cases, to the entire student population.14
New Jersey has implemented a state-wide policy mandating that high
schools conduct drug testing on their students.15 In his 2004 State of the
Union Address, President George W. Bush proposed the allocation of
$23 million in federal funding to schools that implement drug testing
programs for students.16 However, while a bill requesting this funding
was proposed in the House of Representatives, it was never enacted.17
This federal push to implement drug testing programs for all students is
an indication of a future debate that the Supreme Court may have to
decide: Is suspicionless drug testing constitutional for all high school
students when they are subjected to compulsory attendance?18 This Note
suggests that suspicionless drug testing is a violation of both students’

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (upholding a school policy expanding drug testing to
students involved in any extracurricular activity, regardless of any previous suspicion of
individualized use); Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 (finding it constitutional to drug test student
athletes after school had cited specific issues concerning increased drug use in the school);
KRIS E. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: 1789 TO THE PRESENT 68 (Gale Group, Inc.
2000). In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan established a national “War on Drugs”
to combat increased drug use. Douglas B. Marlow, Effective Strategies for Intervening with
Drug Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1025 n.15 (2002). The War on Drugs increased
penalties for drug crimes and implemented mandatory prison sentences for various drug
offenses. Id.
14
RYOKO YAMAGUCHI, LLOYD D. JOHNSTON & PATRICK M. O’MALLEY, UNIV. OF MICH.,
INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND
ASSOCIATION WITH STUDENT DRUG USE 159 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files
PDFs/yesoccpaper2.pdf; Drug Testing Fails Our Youth, http://drugtestingfails.org/
challenge.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Drug Testing Fails].
15
Chris Newmarker, New Jersey To Test High-School Athletes for Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 6, 2006. The New Jersey testing program was implemented to test for performanceenhancing drugs in the wake of the steroid popularity among athletes. Id. Students,
athletes, and their parents have to sign consent forms for the testing and a failure to do so
will render them ineligible for athletics. Id. The tests screen for nearly eighty banned
substances, ranging from steroids to amphetamines. Id.
16
George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, 2004 State of the Union
Address (Jan. 20, 2004).
17
Empowering Parents and Teachers for a Drug-Free Education Act of 2004, H.R. 3720,
108th Cong. (2004).
18
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the majority’s opinion purposefully saved the question of mandatory
testing for all student enrolled in public schools for another day).
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Fourth Amendment privacy rights and their parents’ fundamental rights
to control the upbringing of their children.
A. The Limited Protection of the Fourth Amendment in America’s Public
Schools
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides for
individuals to be secure in their person as against unreasonable search
and seizure.19 The Fourth Amendment contains two distinct clauses that
must be considered separately.20
The first clause states that
unreasonable searches and seizures will be unconstitutional.21 The
second states that specific warrants, with a showing of probable cause,
are required before the government searches property.22 The Supreme
Court has previously held that the warrant clause is not suited for the
school setting, and has only considered the first “reasonableness” clause
of the amendment in its application with respect to students.23

19
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 13. While the Fourth Amendment has generally
been applied to criminal cases, the Court has held that it also applies to government agents,
such as public schools and government employers. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). The Court has stated
that, “The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). The Fourth
Amendment has not been interpreted by the Court to require a warrant in order for a
search to be deemed reasonable. JAMES L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND
COMMENTS 167 (1974). “A search implies some exploratory investigation, or an invasion
and quest, a looking for or seeking out.” 5 AM. JUR. Trials § 2 (1966). A search usually
requires a government entity to pry into hidden places beyond the ordinary senses. Id.
20
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PALMER, supra note 13, at 69. These two clauses have been
labeled the “reasonableness clause,” which refers to whether or not such government
searches are reasonable, and the “warrant clause,” which requires that no warrant shall be
issued without probable cause. Garth Thomas, Note, Random Suspicionless Drug Testing:
Are Students No Longer Afforded Fourth Amendment Protections?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
451, 451 n.7 (2003).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22
Id.; PALMER, supra note 13, at 68-69.
23
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (holding that requiring a teacher obtain a warrant before
pursuing disciplinary action would interfere with the speed and informality required to
successfully maintain discipline in schools, writing, “we hold today that school officials
need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority”); see
infra Part II.C. For protection under the Fourth Amendment, the search has to be
performed by an “instrument or agent of the government.” Blake W. Martell, Hitting the
Mark: Vernonia School District v. Acton, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 223, 224 (1996). In deciding
whether a search is reasonable, the Court must balance the government’s need to conduct
the search with the state’s interest. Id. at 225.
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The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the public school
environment is relatively undeveloped.24 However, recent Court
decisions have established that schools are government agencies and that
Constitutional protections will apply to searches administered by school
administrators.25 At the inception of the Fourth Amendment, its
fundamental basis was the protection of property interests, but the
Court’s jurisprudence in the last century has determined that its focus
should be interpreted as a protection of individual privacy.26 While the
Supreme Court now recognizes privacy as a constitutional right, it is
unclear what level of scrutiny it will use in a constitutional right of
privacy challenge.27

24
See Joanna Raby, Note, Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-Wide Drug
Testing, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 999, 1000 (1999). Traditionally, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has focused on searches and seizures in the criminal setting and only within
the last fifty years has the Court considered its application in the school setting. Id. Prior to
1985, the first time the Fourth Amendment was addressed in the public school context,
school officials were not considered to be government agents with respect to Fourth
Amendment application. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325; Raby, supra, at 1000. The relationship
between students and their teachers was analogous to that of a parent and a child. Raby,
supra, at 1000; see also supra note 11
25
See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
26
PALMER, supra note 13, at 69. Palmer concluded that this shift in interpretation
indicates that privacy has become a constitutional right. Id. Decisions in the last century
have accepted privacy as a constitutional right, but have tried to define exactly what level
of privacy individuals should enjoy. Id.
27
Id. In a line of cases regarding abortion, the Court found the right of privacy to be a
fundamental right found in the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 212; see also
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court has identified three levels of
scrutiny that it will apply when a law or policy is challenged: strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and the rational basis test. PALMER, supra note 13, at 344. The most rigid of these
tests is strict scrutiny, which requires the state to provide both a compelling state interest in
the law, and that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that state interest. Id. Strict
scrutiny is applied to rights that are enumerated in the Constitution, as well as to
unenumerated rights that the Court has found to be fundamental rights. Id. Under the
intermediate scrutiny test, the state must prove that the law must “serve an important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.” Id. at 345. The rational basis test only requires that the legislature has a
reasonable basis for enacting a particular statute. Id. As a result, most laws challenged
under the rational basis test will be upheld. Id. While the Court has recognized the right
of privacy as a fundamental right in other contexts, it did not apply any of the three levels
of scrutiny described when determining what students’ expectations of privacy should be.
Id. Instead, it focused on the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
which most closely resembles the intermediate scrutiny test. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829;
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53.
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Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has identified situations
where it is “reasonable” to perform the search and seizure of an
individual in the absence of individualized suspicion.28 The Court has
self-created these reasonableness exceptions and defined them as
“special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”29 In these
special needs circumstances, the Court created a balancing test that
compares the importance of the individual’s privacy interest against the
governmental interest of waiving the warrant and probable cause
requirements.30
B. The Court-created Special Needs Doctrine and the Court’s Departure from
the Language of the Constitution
In two cases decided on the same day, Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n31 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,32
28
See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997). The Fourth Amendment requires that
searches and seizures be reasonable, and a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in
the absence of individualized suspicion or wrongdoing. Id. In the criminal context,
individualized suspicion is a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure, but the
special needs doctrine has allowed the government to search individuals in situations with
no individualized suspicion of unlawful behavior. Id.
29
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (“Except in certain
well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”).
30
Id. Part of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee for people to be secure in their persons
is that the government is barred from conducting unreasonable searches without some type
of individualized suspicion, which requires a showing of probable cause. Chandler, 520
U.S. at 308. The Court’s application of the balancing test has been criticized for having a
“thumb on the scale,” favoring the schools drug testing policy, as Irene Merker Rosenberg
wrote:
Engaging in a reasonableness inquiry completely divorced from the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
the majority manipulated the constituent factors in the balancing test,
easing the government’s burden of establishing appropriate ends and
means and minimizing not just the individual privacy right but also
the intrusion on it . . . . [I]n effect, the requirement of a governmental
interest of sufficient magnitude, an ends inquiry, has been diluted by
allowing the other two balancing factors to be interjected into the
government interest analysis before any balancing takes place. . . . Yet
the balancing test itself demands that each factor—the private interest,
the government interest, and the nature of the intrusion—be viewed in
isolation before the balance is made, in order to assess correctly the
magnitude of each of these factors.
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Drug Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 349, 351, 365 (1996).
31
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. In these cases, the Court ignored the “probable cause”
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and developed the “special needs” doctrine to
justify the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court
determined that there were circumstances where an individualized suspicion is not
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the Court developed the special needs doctrine and described how it
applies in the context of non-criminal drug testing.33 In both cases, the
Court first established that drug testing through urinalysis is a violation
of an individual’s privacy and constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.34 After making this determination, the Court considered
the reasonableness of non-criminal urinalysis searches in the government
employment context.35 In doing so, the Court weighed the privacy
interests of the individuals against the government’s interest in public
safety.36

necessary when the government has special needs that outweigh the requirements of
probable cause and individualized suspicion. Id. at 624. While the Court did not specify
what level of scrutiny it would apply, it stated that a search may be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if the privacy interests involved are minimal and where there is an
important governmental interest. Id. Although this seems similar to intermediate scrutiny,
the Court also concluded that the state had a compelling interest in drug testing its
employees, and thus this program would have passed strict scrutiny. Id. at 633.
32
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
33
Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
34
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
We have long recognized that a “compelled intrusio[n] into the body
for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed a
Fourth Amendment search. . . . The ensuing chemical analysis of the
sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested
employee’s privacy interests. . . . [C]hemical analysis of urine, like that
of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee,
including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can
it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be tested,
which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act
of urination, itself implicates privacy interests. . . . Because it is clear
that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal
Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that
these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 616-17.
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than
the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they
talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without
public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally
prohibited by law as well as social custom.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175.
35
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-19.
36
Id. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677. These cases both involved government
employees—railroad employees and customs agents. The Court in both cases held that
their expectation of privacy was diminished due to their occupations. In Von Raab, the
Court opined:
We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the
interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n: The Introduction of the
Special Needs Doctrine and the Start Down the Slippery Slope

In Skinner, the Court considered a drug testing program
implemented by the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) that
required blood testing and urinalysis of employees who were involved
in train accidents or violated certain safety rules.37 While there was
evidence of a substantial drug and alcohol abuse problem with railroad
employees in general, there was no individual suspicion, which the
Court had previously required before subjecting an employee to a drug
test.38
To determine what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court administered a balancing test, weighing the governmental interest
in requiring drug testing against the individual’s right to privacy.39 The
Court determined that the governmental interest and special needs
outweighed the individual’s right to privacy and that the drug testing in
this situation was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.40 The Court
also reasoned that individualized suspicion was not required to make
these searches constitutional; the overarching problem of the employees

the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in
respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test. Unlike most
private citizens or government employees in general, employees
involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective
inquiry into their fitness and probity.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
37
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. After evidence showed that drug and alcohol abuse had led
to a significant number of train accidents, the FRA adopted safety standards for the
railroad industry. Id. These standards included breath and urine tests to employees in
violation of safety rules. Id. The Court cited a drug abuse problem affecting the railroad
for over a century, and at trial, the FRA exhibited substantial evidence indicating that the
use of alcohol and drugs on the job was a significant concern in the industry. Id.
38
Id. at 606. “When the balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of
probable cause, we have usually required ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’
before concluding that a search is reasonable.” Id. at 624.
39
Id. at 618. The Court stated:
What is reasonable . . . “depends on all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or
seizure itself.” Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice “is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”
Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
40
Id. at 633.
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in general was sufficient evidence to satisfy the “reasonableness”
requirement.41
But in his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the majority
as being “shortsighted” in sacrificing “fundamental freedoms” in light of
the national war on drugs, which he described as a “momentary
emergenc[y].”42 Marshall was concerned with the majority’s willingness
to stray from the language of the Constitution in favor of a pressing
public concern.43 The Court’s eagerness to stray from the Constitutional
language was again put to the test when it was faced with National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, a case with similar facts to Skinner,
but without a reasonable suspicion of employee drug use.44
2.

National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: Slipping Further, the
Court Finds Drug Testing Constitutional Without a Showing of
Reasonable Suspicion

The Court in Von Raab decided the constitutionality of a urinalysis
drug testing program designed to test members of the United States
41
Id. The Court concluded that the usual requirement of individualized suspicion
would hinder the Railroad’s regulation program. Id. Later, the dissent in Vernonia v. Acton
questioned that finding, stating:
One searches today’s majority opinion in vain for recognition that
history and precedent establish that individualized suspicion is
“usually required” under the Fourth Amendment (regardless of
whether a warrant and probable cause are also required) and that, in
the area of intrusive personal searches, the only recognized exception
is for situations in which a suspicion-based scheme would be likely
ineffectual.
515 U.S. 646, 676 (1995) (O’Connor, J. dissenting). The Court referred to the holding in
Skinner, where a suspicionless test was first upheld, stating that, “it could be plausibly
argued that the fact that testing occurred only after train operators were involved in serious
train accidents amounted to an individualized suspicion requirement in all but name, in
light of the record evidence of a strong link between serious train accidents and drug and
alcohol use.” Id. at 675.
42
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). “Precisely because the need for
action against the drug scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional
excess is great.” Id.
43
Id. at 655.
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the
future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well
settled principles of law will bend.
Id. at 654 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes).
44
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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Customs Service (“Service”) when they applied for transfers or
promotions.45 Unlike the testing program in Skinner, the Service had not
indicated a specific drug problem among its employees and it also
conceded that the program had not been successful in discovering
users.46 Additionally, Service employees, unlike most citizens, have a
diminished expectation of privacy and bodily intrusions.47
Despite a lack of individualized suspicion, or even a specific drug
problem with the employees in general, the Court held that the
governmental interest in administering drug tests on Service employees
outweighed their privacy expectations.48 The Court also stated that the
drug testing program substantially related to the Service’s goal of
deterring suspect employees from obtaining highly sensitive positions.49
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in the Von Raab holding for
the same reasons stated in Skinner.50 However, Justices Scalia and
Stevens came on board in the Von Raab dissenting opinion and
distinguished Von Raab from Skinner, arguing that there was no

Id. at 660. These tests were required of employees seeking three areas of employment:
“drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws,” carrying firearms, and the handling of
classified material. Id. at 660-61. The laboratory specifically tested for marijuana, cocaine,
opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine. Id. at 662. Employees who test positive are
subject to dismissal from the Service. Id. at 663.
46
Id. at 673. “[N]o more than 5 employees out of 3,600 have tested positive for drugs.”
Id.
47
Id. at 672. The Court reasoned that Service employees have a diminished expectation
of privacy compared to the average citizen because “successful performance of their duties
depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity,” and they should not be able to keep
information from their employers that bears directly on their fitness. Id. As a result, their
privacy interest did not outweigh the government’s compelling interest in the safety and
security of protecting our national borders. Id.
48
Id. at 677. These tests were upheld as they pertained to employees involved in drug
interdiction and carrying firearms, but the testing pertaining to the handling of classified
material was remanded because the Court felt that it was too ambiguous to uphold. Id.
The government interest in this case involved ensuring that the front-line personnel were
both physically fit and had “unimpeachable integrity and judgment” when evaluating
those who cross the national borders. Id. at 670.
49
Id. at 676. The Court noted that Service employees often are exposed to criminal
activities in the smuggling of drugs across the nation’s borders. Id. at 669. They are also
tempted by bribes and have been highly involved with dangerous and illegal activity due
to the high sensitivity of their position. Id. “The public interest likewise demands effective
measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to positions that require the incumbent to
carry a firearm, even if the incumbent is not engaged directly in the interdiction of drugs.”
Id. at 670.
50
Id. at 680. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for
sacrificing fundamental freedoms in light of a temporary war on drugs. Id. at 686-87; see
supra note 44.
45
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connection between the frequency of the use and the harm demonstrated
by the Service, which was an essential factor in the Skinner decision.51
Because there was no showing of an actual problem in the field, Justices
Stevens and Scalia opined that there was no social necessity like that
demonstrated in Skinner, and therefore, no governmental interest strong
enough to justify the drug testing policy.52
Despite strong dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court did not find
suspicionless drug testing in the workplace to be an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy until it considered such testing for candidates
running for political office in Chandler v. Miller.53
3.

Chandler v. Miller: The State of Georgia Takes the Special Needs
Doctrine Too Far

The Court held suspicionless drug testing to be unconstitutional for
the first time in Chandler.54 In Chandler, nominees for state office
challenged a Georgia statute that required each nominee to submit to a
drug test within thirty days of being elected or qualifying for election.55
In determining whether the testing was reasonable, the Court looked to
guidance from its previous decisions in Von Raab and Skinner.56

Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenters felt that many of the
facts the majority relied upon in Skinner were not present in Von Raab, stating, “The Court’s
opinion . . . will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that will be solved
by urine testing. . . . To paraphrase Churchill, all this contains much that is obviously true,
and much that is relevant; unfortunately, what is obviously true is not relevant, and what is
relevant is not obviously true.” Id. at 681-82.
52
Id. at 683.
What is absent in the Government’s justifications—notably absent,
revealingly absent . . . is the recitation of even a single instance in which
any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is,
in which the cause of bribetaking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic
law enforcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug
use.
Id.
53
See generally Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
54
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
55
Id. at 308. The Court began its discussion by stipulating that urinalysis conducted by
state officials has been established as a search under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id; see supra note 34. The plaintiffs were members of the Libertarian party
who challenged a Georgia statute that provided “[e]ach candidate seeking to qualify for
nomination or election to a state office shall as a condition of such qualification be required
to certify that such candidate has tested negative for illegal drugs.” GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2140 (1993).
56
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
51
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The issue in Chandler was whether the state’s interest in a drug
testing program qualified as a special need.57 The Court stated that in
order to satisfy the special need requirement, the reason for the test must
be substantial enough to outweigh the individual’s privacy interest.58
While the state argued that the drug tests were justified, the Court
concluded that there was no concrete danger that would allow a Fourth
Amendment exception for suspicionless testing.59
More specifically, the Court found that the state had no legitimate
purpose behind the statute, which addressed a drug problem that could
be dealt with by ordinary law enforcement.60 But the Court stressed that
the decision in Chandler could only be read in its narrow context.61
Consequently, the Court held that the evidence presented by the State
was insufficient to outweigh the privacy interest of the candidates.62 Yet
the Court concluded that blanket drug testing policies can be
constitutional in some cases, stating, “But where . . . public safety is not
genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the
suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.”63

57
Id. Candidates are given thirty days to be tested, are allowed to be tested by their own
physician, and have access to the test results before anyone else. Id. at 318, 320. Once the
urine specimen is provided, it is tested for five specified illegal drugs and the doctor
prepares a certificate reporting the results of the candidate. Id. at 310. In the event that the
candidate tests positive, he or she would have control over the release of the test results. Id.
at 312. At that point, he or she could decide not to run for office and avoid anything being
released to the public regarding drug use. Id. The information would also be kept from
law enforcement. Id.
58
Id. Georgia based its argument on the incompatibility of drug use in state positions.
Id. It argued that the candidate’s judgment and integrity would be impaired, which would
detract from the public’s confidence in the candidate. Id. It also argued that anti-drug laws
would be compromised. Id.
59
Id. at 318-19. From the oral argument, when asked if whether there were particular
instances of drug use by state officials, counsel for the state answered, “No, there is no such
evidence, [and] to be frank, there is no such problem as we sit here today.” Id. at 319.
60
Id. at 320. The Court found that the statute was not designed to identify candidates
who were drug users, nor would it deter drug users from seeking state office. Id.
61
Id. at 320-21. The Court stated that there was a telling difference between the duties of
the employees in Von Raab and the candidates in Georgia. Id. Public office candidates are
subject to more public scrutiny, while customs employees are not subject to the same
scrutiny as those holding traditional jobs. Id. The state relied heavily on the precedent
established in Von Raab. Id.
62
Id. at 321-22. Instead of stating that the need of the state was a special need, thus
qualifying as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court termed the need
“symbolic.” Id. at 322. The Court went on to say that if a need only had to “set a good
example,” then the Court’s opinions and descriptions in its previous cases that describe the
special needs doctrine, were a waste of words and time. Id.
63
Id. at 323.
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By 1987, the Court had established the framework of the special
needs doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.64 Nonetheless, when it was
first faced with a school district’s suspicionless drug testing policy for
students, it had to consider the doctrine against prior case law
concerning the constitutional rights of students.
C. The Diminished Constitutional Rights of Students in Public Schools and
the Enhanced Power of the State
The Court has been inconsistent in determining what legal status
students have vis-à-vis public schools and how constitutional rights
should apply to them.65 The Court’s “reasonableness” inquiry must
consider “the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children.”66 At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, and at early
common law, public schooling was not compulsory, and school
administrators were considered to act in loco parentis.67 Under the in loco
parentis doctrine, schools act in the role of parents in maintaining
discipline in the school setting.68
Since that time, with the advent of compulsory education laws in
every state, schools have gradually taken on more of a state actor role,
thus subjecting the school administrators to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment.69 Complimenting this change of jurisprudence is a recent,
yet somewhat unrelated decision, Lawrence v. Texas,70 in which the Court
acknowledged that “our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance” in determining constitutional rights.71 New Jersey v.

See supra Part II.B.
Compare Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), with Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968) (concerning students’ First Amendment
constitutional rights).
66
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
67
Raby, supra note 24, at 1009. In loco parentis is defined as “[a]cting as a temporary
guardian of a child.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999).
68
See Raby, supra note 24, at 1009; supra Part II.C.
69
Raby, supra note 24, at 1010.
70
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
71
Id. at 571-72. While Lawrence was a somewhat unrelated case granting homosexuals a
fundamental right of privacy against government intrusion under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was a big step for the Court in expanding the general right
of privacy. Id. While the right of privacy is not specifically enumerated in the text of the
Constitution, it is now said to be a constitutional right found in the “penumbras” of the Bill
or Rights. Id. at 595; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64
65

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/7

Donaldson: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Urinalysis: The Constitutional

2006]

Suspicionless Drug Testing in Public Schools

829

T.L.O.72 was the first case in which the Court considered how the Fourth
Amendment should be applied in the school setting.73
1.

New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Limited Student Rights in Public

In T.L.O., a high school teacher caught two female students smoking
in the school bathroom, in violation of a school rule, and took them to
the principal’s office.74 The vice-principal searched the purse of T.L.O.,
found evidence of marijuana use, and turned the purse over to police.75
T.L.O. filed suit and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “the
broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on
the activities of school authorities.”76
The State of New Jersey’s first argument was that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to apply to searches and seizures executed by
law enforcement, not school officials.77 To address this issue, the Court
considered whether public school officials are considered to function in
the capacity of a state actor or that of a parent.78 The Court concluded
that if school officials acted in a parental capacity, students would not be
subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which requires the

469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id.
74
Id. at 328.
75
Id. The vice-principal was originally searching for cigarettes, but upon further
examination, he discovered evidence associated with the use of marijuana and turned it
over to police. Id. After removing the cigarettes, the vice-principal discovered rolling
papers, then proceeded with a more thorough search of the purse, where he found a small
amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a bundle of dollar bills, and a list of other
students who owed T.L.O. money. Id.
76
Id. at 332. Lower federal and state courts have struggled in trying to balance the
Fourth Amendment rights of students and the need for schools to provide a safe learning
environment. Id. at 332 n.2. Some have viewed schools as private parties “acting in loco
parentis and . . . therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
Other courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does apply in school settings,
requiring probable cause before a search is constitutional, and in some courts the special
needs doctrine has replaced the need for probable cause. Id.
77
Id. at 334.
78
Id. at 336. In addressing this issue, the Court considered previous decisions that have
held school officials as state officials when applying the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (“The authority possessed by the State to
prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools although concededly very broad,
must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. . . . The Due Process Clause
also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty.”); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”).
72
73
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involvement of state actors.79 The Court also established that the concept
of schools acting in a parental role is not “consonant with compulsory
education laws,” and concluded that teachers do not act as surrogates of
the parents and thus, do not have the same freedom from the constraints
of the Constitution that parents enjoy. 80
After finding that school authorities are subject to the Fourth
Amendment, the Court applied a reasonableness test to the specific facts
of the case.81 The Court determined the reasonableness of the search by
balancing the school’s need to search the student against a student’s
right to privacy.82 This balancing test requires weighing a privacy
interest that society is “prepared to recognize as legitimate,” against “the
substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.”83
In addressing the issue of a student’s legitimate privacy concern, the
Court first discarded the need for obtaining a warrant prior to searching
a student.84 The Court next modified the requirement of suspicion and

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. The Court rejected the notion that public schools exercise
control as a parental figure, as they might in private schools. Id. The Court stated that such
a view “is not entirely ‘consonant with compulsory education laws.’” Id.
80
Id. “If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be
deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of
their students.” Id. The Court also stated that, “the reasonableness standard should ensure
that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the
legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.” Id. at 343.
81
Id. at 337. “On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for
effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.” Id.
82
Id. According to the Court, a two-fold inquiry had to be satisfied: (1) whether the
search was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the scope of the search was reasonably
related to the circumstances. Id.
83
Id. at 338-39. The Court recognized that maintaining order in the classroom is a
difficult task and drug use has become a major social problem. Id.
84
Id. at 340. The Court held that the warrant requirement
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in
other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when “the burden
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search,” we hold . . . that school officials need not obtain a
warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.
Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
79
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rejected the “probable cause” requirement, stating that the school setting
requires a reasonableness that “stops short” of probable cause.85
The Court applied a two-prong reasonableness test that it had
conceived in Terry v. Ohio.86 Under this test, “one must [first] consider
‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception’ . . . [and] second,
one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.’”87 Accordingly, the Court held that the
vice-principal did not act unreasonably in his search of T.L.O. regarding
the cigarettes or the subsequent search for marijuana.88 The decision in
T.L.O established a diminished right of privacy for students in public
schools, setting the precedent for the Court to follow in reviewing a
challenge to a school district’s suspicionless drug testing policy.89
2.

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: Urinalysis of Student Athletes
Without Individualized Suspicion

While T.L.O. addressed how the Fourth Amendment applies in the
school setting, it did not address whether individualized suspicion was a
necessary requirement in applying the reasonableness balancing test.90
Id. at 341. The Court opined that probable cause is not an irreducible requirement of a
valid search, stating, “Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interest
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard.” Id.
86
Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1962) (a criminal case involving an officer who
searched the outer clothing of a criminal suspect and found a pistol in his pocket).
87
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. The Court stated:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or
other school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or
the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope
when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction.
Id. at 341-42.
88
Id. at 346-47.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 342 n.8. However, in other contexts, the Court has held that “some quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.” Id.
“Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only
where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where ‘other
safeguards’ are available ‘to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).
85
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But in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,91 the Court was confronted
with the issue of a generalized high school drug testing program.
In Vernonia, the school district introduced the Student Athlete Drug
Policy, which authorized random drug tests for its student athletes.92
The school district implemented its drug testing program after
recognizing a sudden influx of drug use in its schools.93 Athletes were
particularly subject to the drug testing because the school district
claimed that the athletes were at the forefront of the school’s drug
culture.94
As a result, the drug testing policy was implemented and applied to
all students involved in interscholastic sports.95 The express purpose of
91
515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995). Respondent, James Acton, was a seventh grader in the
Vernonia School District who wanted to play football in the fall of 1991. Id. at 657. In order
to play, he and his parents were required to sign a form consenting to random drug testing.
Id. They refused to sign the forms and Acton was denied the right to join the football team
as a result. Id.
92
Id. at 648. The drug testing in question required student athletes and parents to sign a
policy consenting to such random testing where they were tested at the beginning of their
sport season, then were subject to random testing throughout the season. Id. at 650.
Students’ names were placed in a pool, from which 10% of the athletes were chosen for
random testing. Id. Each student who was randomly selected was required to identify any
prescription drugs that he or she was taking by showing the doctor’s prescription, then
they were to enter an empty locker room to produce a urine sample in a bathroom where
an adult supervisor of the same sex was present. Id. The supervisor was required to stand
twelve to fifteen feet behind the student as he produced the urine sample. Id. The
supervisor was instructed to listen for normal sounds of urination, then to check for
tampering and any temperature inaccuracies of the urine sample. Id. The sample was then
sent to an independent laboratory to be tested for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana.
Id. The test results were then presented to the superintendent, school principal, viceprincipal, and athletic director for further action. Id. at 650-51. In pertinent part, the policy
read, “I . . . authorize the Vernonia School District to conduct a test on a urine specimen
which I provide to test for drugs and/or alcohol use. I also authorize the release of
information concerning the results of such a test to the Vernonia School District and to the
parents and/or guardians of the student.” Id. at 660.
93
Id. at 648. The school district observed that students were speaking out about the
appeal of the drug culture and were bragging about how the school could not do anything.
Id. The school district also reported a rise in disciplinary problems, including use of
profane language, rudeness, and student suspensions. Id. at 648-49. The school also
introduced expert testimony confirming “the deleterious effects of drugs on motivation,
memory, judgment, reaction, coordination, and performance.” Id. at 649.
94
Id. According to the district court, “a large segment of the student body, particularly
those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary actions
had reached ‘epidemic proportions.’” Id.
95
Id. at 650. Such blanket searches are a greater threat to citizens’ liberties than one
based on individualized suspicion because of the vast population they reach without
giving individuals the opportunity to avoid illegal conduct, thus, not subjecting themselves
to such an invasion of privacy. Id. at 669-70 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). “While the plain
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the policy was to prevent drug use and to promote safety in the school
district.96 The policy required students to submit to a drug test at the
beginning of the season for their sport and also required written consent
from both the student and his or her parents to be subjected to random
testing throughout the school year.97 With his parents as co-plaintiffs,
James Acton, a seventh-grade student athlete in the Vernonia school
district, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that
the policy was a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.98
In reviewing the school district’s policy, the Supreme Court first
considered the nature of the privacy interest at issue.99 The Court
asserted that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not protect all subjective
expectations of privacy,” and an expectation of privacy will differ
depending upon the individual’s relationship with the state.100 In
regards to the Vernonia School District’s policy, the Court determined
that it was crucial that the policy pertained to children who were in the
temporary custody of the state.101
While the Court recognized that minors lack some of the
fundamental rights of adults, it reiterated its holding from T.L.O. that
schools do not act in loco parentis over its students.102 However, the
language of the Amendment does not mandate individualized suspicion as a necessary
component of all searches and seizures, the historical record demonstrates that the framers
believed that individualized suspicion was an inherent quality of reasonable searches and
seizures.” Id. at 671 (quoting Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in
Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 489 (1995)).
96
Id. at 650 (majority opinion).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 651. Acton also made a claim that the policy violated Article I, § 9 of the Oregon
Constitution, which does not pertain to this Note. Id. at 652.
99
Id. at 654.
100
Id. (stating that an individual’s expectations of privacy will vary depending on
whether the individual is “at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park”). The Court
made only brief mention of the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment; it instead
circumvented the “probable cause” and “warrant” language of the Amendment and
quickly jumped into the discussion of the special needs doctrine because this did not
concern criminal acts. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 353.
101
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
102
Id. at 654-55. Despite the view taken by the Court, it also recognized that it “ha[s]
acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities ac[t] in loco parentis,’ with the
power and indeed the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility.’” Id. at 655
(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)). The Court has
determined that private schools are in loco parentis, and are thus exercising the role of a
surrogate parent in regard to its students. Id.; New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
If a school is said to act in loco parentis, it is not considered to be a state actor, and thus, is
free to conduct searches outside the scope of the Constitution. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
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Court emphasized the “custodial and tutelary” power of schools that
allows for schools to apply a degree of supervision to students that is
greater than that imposed on adults.103 Additionally, the Court stated
that the school’s custodial and tutelary responsibility should be taken
into account when considering the reasonableness of the Fourth
Amendment protection of students.104
But after recognizing a
diminished expectation of privacy for students in general, the Court still
held that student athletes have an even lesser expectation of privacy due
to the nature of athletics.105
After considering the scope of the privacy intrusion, the Court
considered the character of the intrusion.106 Reiterating that drug testing
by urinalysis should involve the utmost privacy protection, the Court
determined that collecting a urine sample in the manner done by the
Vernonia School District was non-invasive and thus created a negligible
privacy concern.107
The Court also considered whether or not the school had a
compelling interest in conducting urinalysis drug testing on student
athletes.108 Specifically, the Court defined this interest as one “that
appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light
of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a
genuine expectation of privacy.”109 The need not be compelling, but
103
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55 (suggesting that T.L.O. emphasized this view, instead of
denying it). The Court then limited this protection, stating, “we do not . . . suggest that
public schools . . . have such a degree of control . . . to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to
protect.’” Id. at 655 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 200 (1989)).
104
Id. at 656 (citing to vision, dental, and hearing tests that are routinely performed on
students, as well as state required immunizations, which are requirements for all public
school students).
105
Id. at 657. “School sports are not for the bashful. They require ‘suiting up’ before each
practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the
usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford.” Id.
106
Id. at 658.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 660. Relying on its holdings in both Von Raab and Skinner, the Court looked to
whether or not the school district “demonstrate[d] a ‘compelling need’ for the program.”
Id. at 661.
109
Id. While the difference between “compelling” and “important” may seem to be of
little significance, the language is highly significant when it relates to the level of scrutiny
being applied by the Court. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 364. In both Skinner and Von Raab,
the Court found the governmental interests to be “compelling,” which indicates that the
regulation was examined under strict scrutiny. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. Under strict
scrutiny, the law or regulation would be presumptively invalid unless the government
could show a compelling state interest and the Court determines that the law was narrowly
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instead only an “important” need, and the Vernonia School District’s
policy satisfied the governmental interest requirement without
individualized suspicion because the need to prevent athletes from drug
use outweighed the student’s expectation of privacy.110
Finally, the Court narrowed its opinion, declaring that its decision
applied solely to student athletes because of the immediate threat of
physical harm that athletes may face from drug use.111 The drug testing
policy in Vernonia was found reasonable, and thus, constitutional,
because it fell within the reasonable role that the school takes on as a
guardian and tutor.112
After the decision in Vernonia, district courts were split as to how far
the scope of student drug testing should extend, particularly as school
districts drafted drug testing policies that reached beyond student

tailored to achieve its purpose. See PALMER, supra note 13. Interestingly, the Court
downplayed the significance of the “compelling” language in determining the
government’s interest, by stating, “[i]t is a mistake . . . to think that the phrase ‘compelling
state interest,’ in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of
governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the
question: is there a compelling state interest here?” Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. Instead of
answering this question in isolation, the Court determined that the school district had an
important interest “in light of” the other factors involved in the search. Id. Additionally,
instead of considering each prong of the balancing test individually, and then measuring
the competing interests, the Court bolstered its governmental interest here, but injected the
other two prongs into its analysis of the governmental interest. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at
365.
110
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. The Court interpreted the phrase “compelling state interest”
differently than it has in prior cases. Id. In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has
interpreted it to “describe[ ] a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern.” Id.
The Court stated, “[w]hether that relatively high degree of government concern is
necessary in this case or not, we think it is met.” Id. Additionally,
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs are most severe. “Maturing nervous systems
are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are;
childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound”; “children
grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record
of recovery is depressingly poor.”
Id.
111
Id. at 662. “Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment,
slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened
by the District’s Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to
athletes.” Id. The Court accepted the district court’s finding that there was an immediate
threat to safety, that the athletes were rebelling and that the problem had reached
“epidemic proportions.” Id. at 663 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp.
1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)).
112
Id. at 656.
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athletes.113 In 2002, the Court granted certiorari in a case involving a
school policy that extended drug testing to all students participating in
extracurricular activities.114
3.

Board of Education v. Earls: The Current Urinalysis Standard Extends
to Extracurricular Activities

In 1998, the Tecumseh, Oklahoma school district implemented a
policy that required all students involved in extracurricular activities to
submit to random drug tests.115 Respondents, who were involved in
extracurricular activities at the school and subjected to random drug
testing, challenged the constitutionality of the policy under the Fourth
Amendment, arguing that the school district failed to identify a special
need for the policy.116 Additionally, respondents argued that the policy
should be based on at least a minimum level of individualized
suspicion.117
However, the Court reiterated that individualized
suspicion is not always necessary and a search without such suspicion
may be constitutional when there are “special [governmental] needs.”118
First, the Court addressed the privacy interest that the drug testing
policy threatened to violate.119 Respondents argued that students
participating in extracurricular activities other than sports were not
subjected to the same communal undress and physical examinations as
113
Compare Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), and Tannahill v. Lockney
Indep. Sch., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001), and Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183
F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000), with Willis v. Anderson Cmty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415
(7th Cir. 1998), and Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc
denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998).
114
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002).
115
Id. at 826. The policy required students to take a drug test prior to participation in an
extracurricular activity, and also to be subjected to random testing throughout their
involvement in the activity. Id. The policy reached to programs “such as the Academic
Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom pon,
cheerleading, and athletics.” Id.
116
Id. at 826-27. Respondent, Lindsay Earls was involved in show choir, marching band,
the Academic Team, and the National Honor Society. Id. at 826. Respondent, Daniel James
was seeking participation in the Academic Team. Id. at 827. Again, the respondents
included students who were denied participation and their parents. Id. Despite the fact
that the parents were parties to the suit, the Court never mentioned the interest the parents
have in raising their children as they see fit. Id. Petitioners challenged the policy both on
its face and as applied to students involved in extracurricular activities. Id.
117
Id. at 829. Respondents did not challenge the application of the policy to athletes and
did not make a probable cause argument and asked the Court only to consider
individualized suspicion. Id.
118
Id. “We have long held that ‘the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of [individualized] suspicion.’” Id.
119
Id. at 830.
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athletes, and therefore had a greater expectation of privacy.120 But the
Court discarded that argument, stating that “[t]his distinction . . . was
not essential to our decision in Vernonia, which depended primarily
upon the school’s custodial responsibility and authority.”121 Next, the
Court considered the second prong of the balancing test: the level of
intrusion imposed on the students by the drug testing policy.122 The
Court emphasized that although urinalysis testing should be afforded
substantial privacy, the need to monitor and supervise students must be
considered as well. Accordingly, the Court found the drug testing policy
in Earls to be very similar to that in Vernonia, in fact, even less intrusive,
and concluded that the invasion of the students’ privacy was
insignificant.123
The Court’s third and final issue to consider was the “nature and
immediacy of the government’s concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in
meeting them.”124 Because no individualized concern in the school
district existed, the Court addressed the drug abuse problems confronted
by youths in general, stating that, “the nationwide drug epidemic makes
the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”125 The Court
Id. at 831. The Vernonia Court decided that students who subject themselves to
competitive extracurricular activities subject themselves to the same diminished privacy as
student athletes. Id. The Court recognized that some of these activities required offcampus travel and the same communal undress experienced by student athletes. Id.
Further, many of these activities were highly regulated by the policies of the Oklahoma
Secondary Schools Activity Association. Id. The Court found this regulation to be
analogous to the adults who choose to work in a highly regulated industry such as in Von
Raab and Skinner. Id. at 832.
121
Id. at 831. The Court then explained that students involved in extracurricular
activities also have subjected themselves to limited expectations of privacy similar to those
of athletes. Id. The Court used the example of clubs and activities that require off-campus
travel and communal undress. Id. at 832. The Court also placed significance in the fact that
the school board’s policy required that the test results remain confidential and access to
them was only on a “need to know” basis. Id. at 833. The school policy also assured that
the outcome of the test would not have any criminal repercussions or any bearing on the
student’s academic standing; the only punishment would be a denial of that student’s
extracurricular activity and notification of the student’s parents. Id.
122
Id. at 832.
123
Id. at 833 (holding that this policy was even less intrusive than that of Vernonia
because the results were not turned over to law enforcement, there was no academic
disciplinary action, and the only discipline applied was limiting the student’s participation
in the extracurricular activity).
124
Id. at 834. Again, the Court did not specifically address a standard of review that
must be met. Id. at 836. The Court found the school district’s concerns to be “legitimate,”
but never made any mention of a “compelling” standard that would be required under
strict scrutiny. Id.
125
Id. at 834. The Court cited studies that showed the rising number of high school
seniors reporting they had used drugs since 1995. Id. For instance, the number of seniors
120
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relied heavily on the suspicionless policy it upheld in Von Raab, noting
that drug abuse is a national problem and because the government has a
need to prevent this problem, the Court accepts the school district’s
immediacy argument, making the drug testing necessary under the test
established in Vernonia.126 In expanding Vernonia, the Court emphasized
that the safety interest in deterring drug use is important to all students,
not just athletes.127
However, Justice Ginsburg, joined by three other justices, wrote a
scathing dissenting opinion, stating that, “The particular testing program
upheld today is not reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse:
Petitioners’ policy targets for testing a student population least likely to
be at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging effects.”128 The dissenters
opined that the lack of suspicion prior to the implementation of the
policy was a dispositive factor in distinguishing this case from Vernonia,

using any illicit drug increased from 48.4% in 1995 to 53.9% in 2001. Id. The number of
seniors reporting they had used marijuana jumped from 41.7% to 49.0% during the same
period. Id. (internal citations omitted).
126
Id. at 835. The Court stated that, “it would make little sense to require a school district
to wait for a substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed
to institute a drug testing program designed to deter drug use.” Id. at 836. In the criminal
context, this is exactly the governmental behavior that the probable cause provision of the
Fourth Amendment is intended to protect. Id. While the Court relied heavily on Von Raab
in upholding the drug testing policy, it failed to consider the voluntary nature of working
for the United States Custom Service and the mandatory nature of public schooling. Id.
While participation in extracurricular activities is not mandatory, studies have shown that
nearly 80% of high school seniors participate in extracurricular activities. Nicholas A.
Palumbo, Note & Comment, Protecting Access to Extracurricular Activities: The Need To
Recognize a Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 393,
394 (2002). It is more fitting to consider extracurricular activities to be a requirement of
students who wish to excel beyond the bare minimum high school requirements. Id. In
fact, former president Ronald Reagan referred to extracurricular activities as “valuable
opportunities to discover and develop talent in areas other than those covered within the
classroom.” Id. at 393.
127
Earls, 536 U.S. at 838. However, the dissent points out that, “[h]ad the Vernonia Court
agreed that public school attendance, in and of itself, permitted the State to test each
student’s blood or urine for drugs, the opinion in Vernonia could have saved many words.”
Id. at 845 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Court explained that although the policy in
Vernonia had a closer fit to addressing a specific problem, the school district’s policy in
Earls was still consistent with the school’s custodial responsibility. Id. at 838 (majority
opinion). While the Court upheld the reasonableness of the school district’s policy, it did
so expressing no opinion as to the wisdom of such policies. Id.
128
Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the school district’s special needs
“are not so expansive or malleable as to render reasonable any program of student drug
testing a school district elects to install”).
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which cited a specific problem great enough to invoke the special needs
doctrine.129
The dissent argued that the Vernonia decision could not be
interpreted to “endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all
students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize
the life and health of those who use them.”130 The dissent also pointed
out that the Vernonia majority conspicuously did not go so far as to
permit drug testing of all students enrolled in public schools.131
The Earls dissenters then addressed each step of the Vernonia
balancing test, first considering the nature of the privacy intrusion.132
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg examined the Vernonia Court’s specific
emphasis on the limited privacy expectations of student athletes, who
subject themselves to communal dressing by choosing to “go out for the
team.”133 While the Vernonia Court held that athletics are “not for the
bashful,” the Earls dissent held that other extracurricular activities cater
to all types of students, including those who are modest and shy.134
In examining the third prong of the balancing test—the immediacy
of the governmental concern—the dissenters focused on the stark
contrast between the reasoning behind the policy in Vernonia, and that in
Earls, where the school district had consistently reported to the federal
government that no drug problem existed in its school district.135 The
dissent agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, that “without a
demonstrated drug abuse problem among the group being tested, the
Id. at 844.
Id. (stating that a student who has a personal privacy interest in the items she brings
to school should also have that same privacy expectation regarding the chemical
composition of her urine).
131
Id. at 845 (stating that if it had chosen to extend such testing to all students, it “could
have saved many words”). As Justice Ginsburg interpreted the Court’s decision in her
concurring opinion in Vernonia, “the Court’s opinion . . . reserve[s] the question whether
the District, on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine
drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all
students required to attend school.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
132
Earls, 536 U.S at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133
Id.; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
134
Earls, 536 U.S at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent next considered the second
prong of the Vernonia test, “the character of the intrusion . . . complained of,” which is
outside the purview of this Note; for a discussion of this topic, see id. at 842.
135
Id. at 849 (citing Tecumseh School’s Application for Funds under the Safe and DrugFree Schools and Communities Program, stating, “types of drugs [other than alcohol and
tobacco] including controlled dangerous substances, are present [in the schools] but have
not identified themselves as major problems at this time”).
129
130

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 7

840

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

efficacy of the District’s solution to its perceived problem is . . . greatly
diminished.”136
Finally, distinguishing the drug testing in Earls from the
suspicionless testing in both Skinner and Von Raab, the dissent found that
both policies were implemented to save lives rather than to protect the
health risks that are associated with drug use.137 The dissent noted the
“sad irony” of the schools tutelary and custodial responsibility, which
“require[s] them to ‘teach by example’ by avoiding symbolic measures
that diminish constitutional protections.”138
According to the dissent, Vernonia was a correct decision for two
reasons: (1) the “special health risks” of student athletes; and (2) the
school district’s contention that the athletes “were the leaders of the drug
culture” that the policy was intended to punish.139 Neither of these
reasons were present prior to the school district’s policy in Earls, which
the dissenters suggested should be the dispositive factor in holding such
a policy unconstitutional.140
Yet while the dissent attempted to
distinguish Earls from Vernonia, it failed to mention a significant
fundamental right, which was present in both cases, but never
considered: parents’ fundamental right to control the upbringing of their
children.141
D. Do Parents Have a Voice in the Matter?
In both Vernonia and Earls, the parents of the students also refused to
consent to the drug testing and were parties to the suit against the
school.142 Noticeably absent in the Court’s discussion in either case was
Id. at 850 (quoting Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1277 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 851-52.
138
Id. at 855. “That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes.” Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943)). Additionally, in T.L.O., the Court had emphasized that
children learn as much by example as by exposition. It would be
incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing
their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional
democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers
from the need to respect constitutional protections.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985).
139
Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995)).
140
Id. at 849.
141
Id.; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000).
142
Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648.
136
137
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any mention of parents’ interest in controlling the upbringing of their
children.143 While the Court’s standard of review regarding parents’
rights to control the upbringing of their children has not always been
consistent, it has recognized that a parent’s right to control the
upbringing of their children is a fundamental right protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.144
However, the Court has not consistently applied a level of scrutiny
when adjudicating the parental right to control the upbringing of
children.145 The plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville labeled the right

Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66. Summing up its jurisprudence in this area, in the plurality
opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote:
The liberty interest at issue in this case–the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children–is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75
years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, we held that the “liberty” protected by
the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a
home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their
own.” Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, we again held that
the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.” We
explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.” We returned to the subject in Prince v.
Massachusetts, and again confirmed that there is a constitutional
dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.”
Id.; see William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights
Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177 (2000). The Court first recognized the Due
Process protection of parents to control the upbringing of their children in two cases
decided in the 1920s. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court in Pierce held that parents and guardians “have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [children] for additional obligations.”
268 U.S. at 535. “Our cases, it is true, have not set out exact metes and bounds to the
protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78
(Souter, J., concurring).
145
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J. concurring). “The opinions . . . recognize such a
right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would
apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.” Id. Most rights that are
labeled as “fundamental” by the Court will be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However,
even though it is a fundamental right, the Court offers limited protection of parents’ right
to control the upbringing of their children. Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment:
A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 454 (2002). The Court has never applied
143
144
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of parents to control the upbringing of their children as a fundamental
right, but refused to establish an applicable level of scrutiny.146 Yet in a
prior case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,147 the Court demonstrated the flexibility of
its application of the parents’ fundamental rights, and struck down a
state compulsory education law when it combined the plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights with the parents’ right to control the upbringing of
their children.148 The plaintiff’s argument in Yoder challenging the state’s
compulsory education law was bolstered by the hybrid challenge.149
But the Court’s precedent in hybrid cases is still unclear when
challenges are made combining the parents’ right to control the
upbringing of their children with an enumerated constitutional right, but
the Court’s holdings in Yoder and Troxel could strengthen a plaintiff’s
argument when challenging a school district’s suspicionless drug testing
policy.150 If the Court were to consider this fundamental right in the
future, its outcome may be different from the few limitations school
districts now have following the holding in Earls.151
E. Limitations on School Districts Post-Earls
The Supreme Court has not suggested that there is any limitation on
how far school districts can expand drug testing policies.152 Nonetheless,
there has recently been a push by some states and the federal
government to pursue these policies more aggressively.153 In his 2004
State of the Union address, President Bush proposed federal funding for
such programs, stating:

strict nor intermediate scrutiny to the parental right and the strength of this fundamental
right is still unclear. Id.
146
See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
147
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
148
Id. at 233.
149
Id. The Court stated, “rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State.” Id.
150
Ross, supra note 144, at 185.
151
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
152
See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
153
Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/drug_testing/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2005); Chris Newmarker, New
Jersey to Test High-School Athletes for Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES, May 6, 2006, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/highschoolsports/2002975668_prepjersey06.html;
ESPN, Official Wants Texas High School Athletes Tested, Jan. 27, 2007, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/news/story?id=2744977.
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In my budget, I proposed new funding to continue our
aggressive, community-based strategy to reduce
demand for illegal drugs. Drug testing in our schools
has proven to be an effective part of this effort. So
tonight I proposed an additional $23 million for schools
that want to use drug testing as a tool to save children’s
lives. The aim here is not to punish children, but to send
them this message: We love you, and we don’t want to
lose you.154
While a bill was never promulgated,155 the White House has
continued to pursue its aggressive policy toward student drug testing
through the Office of National Drug Control, whose director, John P.
Walters, has labeled student drug testing as the “silver bullet” in
combating student drug use.156 Despite the strong push by the federal
government and the Court’s willingness to uphold school district drug
testing policies, there has been some restraint shown in not allowing
universal drug testing in public schools.157 In 2001, the Northern District
of Texas decided the constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing
program that applied to all students enrolled in a public school.158
1.

Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District: Compulsory Testing
Policy Struck Down Under Vernonia

In 2001, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas struck down a school district’s drug testing policy that extended to
all students.159 Because this case was decided prior to the Earls decision,

Bush, supra note 16.
Empowering Parents and Teachers for a Drug-Free Education Act of 2004, H.R. 3720,
108th Cong. § 2(d) (2004). The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives and
proposed $23 million in funding. Id.
156
JOHN P. WALTERS, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
pdf/drug_testing.pdf.
157
Id. See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; Tannahill v. Lockney Indep.
Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
158
Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919.
159
Id. at 920 n.1. Prior to the implementation of the policy in question, Lockney
Independent School District had established a suspicion-based testing program for all
students and staff members who had a reasonable suspicion of being under the influence at
school functions. Id. A reasonable suspicion was said to exist when a student or staff
member displayed “at risk” behavior. Id. The school district discussed a policy that would
apply to students involved in extracurricular activities, but, after debate, the school board
made a final decision to subject all students to a suspicionless drug testing program that
would require mandatory testing for all incoming sixth graders and monthly testing of 10%
154
155
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the court used the Vernonia balancing test and determined that the drug
testing policy was unconstitutional.160
The court reasoned that
compulsory attendance is different from the voluntary participation in
extracurricular activities and it would not be reasonable to subject all
students to suspicionless drug testing.161
More specifically, in Tannahill, the court recognized that the general
student population should enjoy greater privacy than student athletes.162
Additionally, the court distinguished suspicionless drug testing of
students from the testing imposed in highly regulated industries,
holding that the government did not have a compelling interest in
implementing such drug tests in public schools.163 Though the district
court recognized the good faith attempt of the school district, the court
found the privacy rights of students to be more important than the
governmental interest.164
While this drug testing policy was declared unconstitutional under
the Vernonia balancing test prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Earls,
such post-Earls policies may withstand constitutional challenges by

of the school’s students. Id. at 921-22. The school board cited a significant drug problem in
the area as its reason for implementing the program. Id.
160
Id. at 930-31. In its interpretation on the Vernonia decision, the United States District
Court of the Northern District of Texas relied on the Supreme Court’s discussion as to why
student athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy than the student population in general.
Id. at 929. The Texas Court said that “compulsory attendance at school is much different
than voluntary participation in extracurricular activities.” Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. “Every child, at least in Texas, must attend school. School attendance does not
trigger an instant diminution of rights.” Id. at 929 n.22 (quoting Brooks v. East Chambers
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989)).
163
Id. at 930.
[T]he academic studies of a student, while very important, do not
embody the immediate and severe life and death repercussions as do
the decisions of these employees. A student’s tools of pens, notebook
paper, and protractors have never been equated with locomotives, the
hazardous chemicals and equipment of a custodian, the firearms or
interdiction efforts of a customs agent, or the prescription pads and
EKG machines used by a physician.
Id.
164
Id. The district court stressed that the student body in general has a higher
expectation of privacy than the student athletes in Vernonia, whom the Supreme Court
decided had a lower expectation of privacy. Id. The district court also rejected the school
district’s rationale for the suspicionless drug testing program, which was that the school
district had a significant drug and alcohol problem. Id. The school district’s prior drug
testing program had been in place for several years, yet had never encountered a single
incident of drug use indicating a drug problem in the school district. Id.
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applying the less restrictive reasoning used in Earls.165 Following the
Court’s decision in Vernonia, district courts were split on the issue of how
far student drug testing policies could extend.166 Now, with the more
expansive decision in Earls, school districts have again been given no
specific limitations as to which students should be subjected to
suspicionless drug testing.167
In recent years, schools have extended their drug testing policies
beyond that of student athletes and students participating in
extracurricular activities.168 Some schools have expanded the reach of
their drug testing policies to students who drive to school, while others
have expanded the reach to all students enrolled at the school.169 While
the Court has emphasized the importance of limiting students’ exposure
to suspicionless drug testing to those students who have voluntarily
subjected themselves to privileged activities, the Court’s holding in Earls
opened the door to suspicionless testing for an even broader category of
students, which could have dangerous implications on students’ rights
to privacy while also sending a message contrary to the fundamental
tenet of American jurisprudence—guilty until proven innocent.170

165
See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919.
166
See Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 919. See generally Trinidad Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 963
P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998).
167
Earls, 536 U.S. 822.
168
See Drug Testing Fails, supra note 14 (follow “Alexander [Ohio] School District”
hyperlink and the “Katy [Texas] School District” hyperlink).
169
See id. (follow “Alexander [Ohio] School District” hyperlink and the “Tippecanoe
(Ind.) School Corp.” hyperlink); see also YAMAGUCHI, JOHNSTON & O’MALLEY, supra note 14,
at 159.
170
See Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646. The decisions in both Earls and Vernonia
spend a great deal of time discussing how lower expectations of privacy are appreciated by
our “students” in our “public schools” before going into an analysis of how it applies
specifically to athletes and students involved in extracurricular activities. Rosenberg, supra
note 30, at 360. Rosenberg states that this general classification of students is telling
because there is no reason that a drug testing policy that is made applicable to all students
would be given any less deference than that applied to student athletes. Id. In assessing
the governmental interest in conducting suspicionless drug testing, the Court first
considered how drugs can have more damaging and addictive effects on developing minds
than on adults. Id. The Court also considered the effects of drugs on the school population
as a whole, the parens patriae interest the school has over the children, and the special need
athletes may have in the examination of their physical health and their diminished
expectation of privacy. Id. As Rosenberg points out, only the last factor, applying to
student athletes, would have an application that would not also apply to the student
population as a whole. Id. In Earls, the Court considered the same factors, but made the
same exception for students involved in extracurricular activities. 536 U.S. at 838. In
reading the Court’s reasoning for students involved in extracurricular activities having a
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III. ANALYSIS
Since the introduction of the special needs doctrine in Skinner and
Von Raab, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions have gradually
broadened the doctrine’s scope.171 This Part will first demonstrate how a
school-wide drug testing policy would likely be upheld if the Court were
confronted with the issue today.172 Part III will also discuss the negative
effects such a policy would have on America’s youth.173
The cases discussed in Part II of this Note described the route the
Court took in diluting the language of the Fourth Amendment to uphold
the constitutionality of suspicionless student drug testing.174
Additionally, Part II demonstrated how the Court has been inconsistent
in its application and has given great deference to school policies, which
cite society’s drug problem with no reference to individualized suspicion
in schools.175 Part III.A will discuss how the Earls Court disregarded
much of the reasoning it used in Vernonia to again broaden the scope of
student drug testing.176
Part III will look at each element of the Court’s reasoning to
demonstrate how the same reasoning would apply to all students
enrolled in a public school.177 Part III.B will discuss the social policy of
sending a message to schoolchildren that they are guilty until proven
innocent, and the importance of preserving the constitutional rights of
students in public schools.178 Finally, Part III.C will discuss the
possibility of compulsory drug testing at schools and will discuss how a
blanket policy such as the national “war on drugs” should not be
adequate to substitute for the individualized suspicion that was
previously required before conducting searches in schools under the
Fourth Amendment.179

lesser expectation of privacy, it is hard to find a meaningful difference between the
communal undress experienced in extracurricular activities to that of a required physical
education class. Rosenberg, supra note 30.
171
See supra Part II.C.
172
See infra Part III.C.
173
See infra Part III.B.
174
See supra Part II.
175
See supra Part II.
176
See infra Part III.A.
177
See infra Part III.
178
See infra Part III.B.
179
See infra Part III.C.
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A. The Earls Expansion of Reasonableness and the Flexibility that the
Decision Creates for Schools To Impose Drug Testing Policies
While no court has ruled on the constitutionality of a drug testing
program as applied to all students since Tannahill, the reasoning in Earls
suggests that such a policy might be held constitutional if the issue were
to arise in the future.180 When the Court upheld the constitutionality of
suspicionless drug testing in Von Raab, Skinner, Vernonia, and Chandler, it
was careful to suggest that its decisions were only based on the
balancing of the unique factors relevant to each case.181 However, the
Earls decision again left school districts guessing as to how far they can
go in administering suspicionless drug tests to their students.182 To
demonstrate, it is first necessary to examine the erosion of students’
privacy interests that occurred between the decision in Vernonia and in
Earls.183
1.

The Nature of the Privacy Interest Intruded Upon

In Vernonia, where the constitutionality of suspicionless testing for
student athletes was upheld, the Court first discussed how student
athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy because of the communal
undress they are subjected to on a routine basis.184 While the Vernonia
Court spent a significant amount of time explaining the diminished
privacy expectations of athletes, it quickly dismissed the significance of
the student athlete status in Earls.185 In fact, in Earls, the Court stated
that the Vernonia language regarding student athletes was not central to
its decision, and in any event, students involved in extracurricular
activities are subject to the same types of intrusions as athletes.186 After
determining that the characteristics of student-athletics were not a
central issue, the Court defended its prior reasoning and stated that
many clubs and activities participate in off-campus travel and communal
undress, which lessens the students’ right to privacy.187 However, as the
dissent in Earls points out, it does not make sense for the Court to write
180
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832 (2002); Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 920 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
181
See supra Part II.
182
Earls, 536 U.S. at 844.
183
Id. at. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
184
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. “By choosing to ‘go out for the team,’ they voluntarily
subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students
generally.” Id.
185
Compare id. at 648, with Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
186
Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
187
Id. at 832.
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extensively on an aspect of its reasoning unless it is central to its
holding.188
Additionally, the Court’s argument that students’ rights to privacy
are lessened because they are already subjected to health tests such as
vaccinations and physical exams also goes unfounded.189 While students
are required to submit to such examinations, these tests are performed
by an individual student’s family physician and can be done on the
student’s own time.190 These tests are not conducted in search of
“anything in particular,” and thus, there is nothing to give rise to
suspicion.191 Such tests do not violate the student’s right of privacy as
much as subjecting the student to a random test while at school under
the close scrutiny of a supervisor who hovers behind the student
providing the urine sample.192
While the Court in Vernonia and Earls opened the door to school
district drug testing policies for students involved in athletics and
extracurricular activities, it conspicuously omitted discussion as to
whether such a policy should apply to all students.193 However, by its
broad rationale, any student participating in physical education class,
which is mandatory in many states, could be subjected to suspicionless
drug testing.194 Like the communal undress, which the Court used to
justify an eroded privacy interest in the athletic context, students
involved in physical education are also required to change clothes and
shower for class.195
Participation in physical education class also places students in the
same health risk category, due to the physical exertion, that the Court
heavily relied upon in upholding drug testing in Vernonia.196 Like
athletes and students involved in extracurricular activities, all students
enrolled in public school are required to receive various vaccines and

Id.
See supra Part II.C.3.
190
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 312 (1997). In Chandler, this was a factor added to the
balancing test which diminished the argument for an invasion of privacy. Id.
191
Id.
192
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
193
See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
194
Raby, supra note 24, at 1024 (discussing why all students in public schools should be
subjected to random drug testing).
195
Id.
196
Id.
188
189
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physical examinations, again leaving them subject to suspicionless drug
testing following the reasoning in Earls.197
2.

Character of the Intrusion

The Earls Court next determined the nature of the intrusion
introduced by the school policy.198 Neither the Earls Court nor the
Vernonia Court gave much weight to students’ rights of privacy,
notwithstanding precedent that described privacy as, “the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.”199 Instead, the Court compared the privacy intrusion to
conditions “typically encountered in public restrooms, which men,
women, and especially schoolchildren use daily.”200
This comparison fails to consider important differences between
typical urination in a public restroom and the method of drug testing
that requires a student to urinate under surveillance.201 One does not
typically expect to be monitored while urinating in a public restroom
with the expectation of producing a urine sample for inspection.202 Also,
one typically urinating in a public restroom is not required to capture his
or her urine in a container, which will later be subjected to scientific drug
analysis.203 Finally, students subjected to such random testing are often
removed during class hours and required to urinate in a designated
testing area.204
The Court’s determination of such a limited privacy interest is also
contrary to its privacy evaluation in Skinner, where it noted that the
urinalysis was less intrusive because the urine sample was collected in a
medical office and was not subject to close monitoring of a supervisor.205
Also, the testing in Skinner was conducted by an anonymous medical
practitioner, as opposed to a familiar teacher whom the students would
be interacting with on a daily basis.206 These factors, which were directly
emphasized in prior case law, were not even considered by the Court in
Id.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
199
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
200
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
201
Darrel Jackson, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of Students’ Fourth Amendment
Rights?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673, 684 (1996).
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
197
198
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Vernonia or Earls.207 As a result, while the Court in Vernonia overlooked
many factors it could have considered in evaluating the student’s
privacy interest, it gave even less weight to the student’s right of privacy
in Earls.208
3.

Immediacy of the Governmental Concern

Finally, the Earls Court found a pressing concern by meshing the
limited evidence of drug use in the school district with the national
concern of a drug epidemic.209 The Court relied heavily on its decision in
Von Raab, which held drug testing constitutional on a mere showing that
drug abuse is a serious societal problem.210 However, these societal
issues were applied in Von Raab on the specific facts of the case, which
were “installed to avoid enormous risks to the lives and limbs of others,
not dominantly in response to the health risks to users invariably present
in any case of drug use.”211
Similarly, the school district in Vernonia cited a drug culture in its
schools to support the argument for a need to drug test its students
without a prior showing of individualized suspicion.212 It argued that
there was substantial evidence of the drug culture among the students,
and that the athletes were the leaders of that drug culture; as a result, it
also argued that it needed to implement a drug testing policy to identify
which students were using drugs.213 As a result, the Vernonia Court
allowed the school district to have both sides of the argument—both a
justification for the testing by having an identified problem and the
burden of identifying the source of the problem.214 Such an allowance
leaves students with no protection against suspicionless searches.

207
See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995).
208
Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646, with Earls, 536 U.S. 822. The Court determined the
invasion to be “negligible” in Vernonia, but the Earls Court, without defining the interest,
gave even less weight to students’ privacy interests.
209
Earls, 536 U.S. at 836. The school district, in years prior to the policy’s adoption, had
reported to the Federal Government that “types of drugs [other than alcohol and tobacco]
including controlled dangerous substances, are present [in the schools] but have not
identified themselves as major problems at this time.” Id. at 849.
210
Id. at 850.
211
Id.
212
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
213
Id. at 649-50.
214
Id. In its argument for the implementation of suspicionless drug testing, the Court
discussed the burden placed on teachers who would have to identify students who might
have problems with drugs. Id. at 648-49. At the same time, the Court justified its decision
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Despite the Court’s insistence that Von Raab, Skinner, and Vernonia
were to be interpreted narrowly on the unique facts of each case, the
Earls Court interpreted these decisions broadly in an effort to combat the
national drug epidemic.215 As Justice O’Connor eloquently wrote in her
dissenting opinion:
It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to
our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis. But
we must also stay mindful that not all government
responses to such times are hysterical overreactions;
some crises are quite real, and when they are, they serve
precisely as the compelling state interest that we have
said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional
rights. The only way for judges to mediate these
conflicting impulses is to do what they should do
anyway: stay close to the record in each case that
appears before them, and make their judgments based
on that alone. Having reviewed the record here, I
cannot avoid the conclusion that the District’s
suspicionless policy of testing all student athletes
sweeps too broadly, and too imprecisely, to be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.216
In the history of the Constitution, the Court has been wary of blanket
suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amendment and the dissent
was quick to note that threats such as the “war on drugs” should not
have superseded the traditional requirement of individualized
suspicion.217 In fact, prior to the cases discussed in Part II of this Note,
suspicionless tests were determined to be per se unreasonable in light of
the Fourth Amendment.218
The Vernonia dissent mocked the majority opinion that
individualized suspicion is only “usually required”.219 As Justice
O’Connor wrote, “One searches [the Vernonia majoriy’s opinion] in vain
for recognition that history and precedent establish that individualized

by the fact that the school boards were within constitutional boundaries by implementing
these programs based on observations made by teachers of a perceived drug problem in
the school district. Id. at 649-50.
215
See supra Parts II.B-II.C.
216
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 686 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.C.2.
217
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
218
See supra Part II.C.2.
219
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 676.
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suspicion is ‘usually required’ under the Fourth Amendment (regardless
of whether a warrant and probable cause are also required).”220
B. A Message to Our Children: You Are Guilty Until Proven Innocent
While there is no doubt that the goals of such drug testing policies
are well intended, such policies send the wrong message to the youth of
America.221 Constitutional guarantees should sometimes be challenged
the most when they are under the guise of working for the benefit of
society.222
Despite the benevolent intentions of the school districts, these drug
tests send a message to children that they are guilty until proven
innocent, turning the fundamental American tenet of presumed
innocence on its head.223 Schoolchildren in America are educated at a
young age about the freedoms, privileges, and liberties guaranteed by
our government, yet are deprived of all of these when they are subjected
to suspicionless drug tests in public schools.224 “[M]any schools, like
many parents, prefer to trust their children unless given reason to do
otherwise.”225

Id. The Court recognized that the only exception would be in situations where a
suspicion based search would be ineffectual, which it did not consider to be the case in
Vernonia.
221
Brief for the Respondent at 26, Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (No. 94-590).
222
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evilminded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Id.
223
Brief for Respondent at 17, supra note 221, at 17. This is inconsistent with the Court’s
view that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (quoting Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
224
Jackson, supra note 201, at 695. Adolescents are taught about the values of our society
in the home and at school, so it is important for the educators to respect the role they play
in preparing students for the responsibilities and expectations of society. Anthony G.
Buzbee, Who Will Speak for the Teachers? Precedent Prevails in Vernonia School District v.
Acton, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1229, 1230-31 (1996). “The duty to prepare a child for ‘additional
obligations,’ . . . must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
225
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 682.
220
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The Court in Chandler addressed the role of government as a leader
by example, quoting prior case law, “Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by
its example.”226 The government does not play a more important role in
teaching by example than it does in the public school environment,
where children are first introduced to the values of our government.227
Constitutional rights should especially be protected in the school
environment where we are teaching students the value of citizenship.228
Otherwise we “strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”229
Although the Court in both Vernonia and Earls relied heavily on the
school’s role as a custodial and tutelary institution that acts in loco
parentis,230 it failed to consider the effect of treating students like secondclass citizens and the message such treatment conveys to the students.231
Additionally, though the Court has established that the state has a
legitimate interest in maintaining safety in its school districts, subjecting
students to suspicionless testing is neither the most efficient nor the most
effective means of achieving such a goal.232
C. Compulsory Education Equals Compulsory Drug Testing?
The Court has already extended its special needs analysis to school
districts wishing to drug test athletes and students involved in
extracurricular activities, but it has not yet decided the constitutionality
of a policy that applies to all students enrolled in public schools.233
Despite compulsory education laws and the Court’s recognition of the
importance of education in our society, the Court has been reticent in
recognizing education as a fundamental right.234 While the Supreme
Court has not included education as a fundamental right, and thus does
not require strict scrutiny be used when examining state laws, most

Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485)).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 657 (1943)).
228
Id.
229
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
230
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.
231
Jackson, supra note 201, at 695.
232
See infra Part IV.
233
See supra Part II.C.
234
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
226
227
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states have concluded that education is a fundamental right under their
respective state constitutions.235
The Court, however, in its recognition of the importance of
education in the United States, stated that “education provides the basic
tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to
the benefit of us all.”236 While such a right may not be enough to require
strict scrutiny of state legislation and school board policies, it might
outweigh the school’s need to impede on students’ rights to education
when it is combined with the parents’ rights to raise their children and
students’ rights to privacy.237
In both the Vernonia and Earls decisions, the Court refers to
governmental needs that apply to schoolchildren in general, but makes
narrow holdings based on students’ participation in athletics or
extracurricular activities.238 In contrast to the situations in Skinner and
Von Raab, where employees of closely regulated industries were
subjected to random drug testing, and had the option to seek another
job, public school children would not have any other option if they chose
to protect their bodily integrity by refusing to submit to suspicionless
drug testing.239
While there is no doubt that students benefit from the education they
are provided, such education should not be deemed a privilege when
examined in light of compulsory education laws. It is an unnecessary
invasion of a student’s right to privacy to be subjected to compulsory
drug tests without a showing of an individualized suspicion or a
compelling state need.240
IV. CONTRIBUTION
While education may be another approach to combating a national
drug problem, it is not the role of the federal government to control how
school districts deal with their respective disciplinary issues.241 School
Palumbo, supra note 126, at 397.
Id.
237
Id.
238
See supra Parts II.C.2-II.C.3.
239
See supra Parts II.B.1-II.B.2.
240
See supra Part II.C.2.
241
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). “Providing public schools ranks at the
very apex of the function of a State.” Id. There is no doubt that the drug testing programs
in question are well-intentioned, but the rights we are provided in the Constitution should
not be sacrificed merely because the state has a benevolent purpose. As Ben Franklin
235
236
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districts are permitted to make this decision at their discretion.242 This
Part suggests that the Court should add a fourth factor to its balancing
test: parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children. The
Court should also implement a strict scrutiny standard of review to
apply to the governmental interest prong of the balancing test for
suspicionless drug testing policies, which would require the school
district to show a “compelling” interest that is narrowly tailored to
achieve its stated goal.243
A. The Proposed Balancing Test
The revised balancing test would take into account: (1) the nature of
the privacy interest compromised by students who are subjected to such
testing; (2) the character of the intrusion imposed by the policy; (3) the
compelling governmental concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in
meeting them; and (4) the parents’ fundamental Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process rights to control the upbringing of their children.
1.

A Proposed Fourth Prong to the Balancing Test: Parents’ Right to
Control the Upbringing of Their Children

In both Vernonia and Earls, the claims challenging the drug testing
programs in question were brought by both the students and their
parents.244 Because the parents had concerns about the school district
violating the privacy rights of their children, they did not sign the
consent form allowing the searches. While they were free to refuse
signing the consent form, their children were denied the opportunity to
participate in extracurricular activities. At that point, a concerned
parent’s only option was to file a lawsuit or allow his child to be
deprived of the opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities.

stated in 1755, “Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary
safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly:
Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755). The best way to combat the national drug abuse
problem may be to use the money that is being channeled into drug testing programs to
educate children on the dangers of drug abuse. Such programs would inform children of
the potential dangers of drug abuse without imposing an adversarial relationship between
students and administrators. Also, such a relationship sends schoolchildren the wrong
message that they are guilty until proven innocent.
242
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. “[C]ourts are not school boards or legislatures, and are illequipped to determine the ‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s program of
compulsory education.” Id.
243
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
244
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.
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Pressure to comply with such testing would be even greater in
school districts that impose drug testing on all students. Parents would
not have a choice in the matter and would have to consent to the testing
or send the child to a private school. Despite this concern, the Court’s
current stance seems to open the door to such testing in public schools,
which leaves parents with very little control over the upbringing of their
children.
While the parental interest in their children’s right of privacy is
great, the Court does not even consider this interest in Vernonia or
Earls.245 This should be another factor considered by the Court in its
balancing test, especially when the claim is brought by both the student
and the student’s parents. The Court’s decisions regarding the parents’
rights to raise their children against the school’s interest in maintaining
order have been mixed, but the plurality decision in Troxel v. Granville
held that it was a fundamental right.246
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court combined the parents’ right to
control the upbringing of their children with an enumerated First
Amendment right to defeat the state law. 247 The Court may not have
come to the same decision had it simply been a First Amendment
challenge or a right of the parents to control the upbringing challenge,
but by combining the two constitutional rights, the plaintiffs were able to
defeat the state’s compulsory education laws. This type of hybrid
challenge should also be available to parents challenging a school
district’s drug testing program.
Moreover, the Court needs to be more consistent in its application of
the parental right to raise children. Giving such substantial weight to the
parents’ right in Yoder and Troxel, then failing to mention that right in
Vernonia or Earls, creates cloudy precedent for lower courts to follow.
Such inconsistency supports the argument that the Court simply applies
whatever test it deems necessary to reach the predetermined result of its
choice. But giving parents a waiver or an option to opt-out would be a
sufficient solution. Some parents may welcome the school’s assistance in
monitoring their children, while others may choose to trust their children
or handle such issues within the family.

245
246
247
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Strict Scrutiny Application to the Governmental Concern Prong

In dealing with the special needs doctrine, the Court has been
inconsistent in what standard of review it applies to the governmental
concern prong.248 The two decisions regarding suspicionless drug
testing in schools have also been unclear as to what standard the Court
will apply.249
This confusion is understandable considering the
competing rights involved in such testing, but to establish a more
concrete precedent, the Court must establish a standard of review for
such cases. This Note proposes that such drug testing policies be
subjected to strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, the school testing policy would be
presumptively invalid, but could be upheld in situations of
individualized suspicion and in situations where the school district can
establish a prevalent drug problem or individualized suspicion that
would require a drug testing program. These situations would give the
school district a compelling reason to implement such a program.
Strict scrutiny would be appropriate because of the several rights
which are at issue in such testing. A hybrid of both the students’
enumerated Fourth Amendment rights and the parents’ fundamental
rights to control the upbringing of their children should be sufficient
enough interests for the Court to trigger its strict scrutiny standard of
review.
There is no doubt about governmental concerns with drug use, but
that does not justify the Court circumventing the language of the
Constitution. There is also a national concern regarding adult drug use,
but that does not entitle police officers to search every citizen and use the
national drug problem to justify the search. The Court has always had a
preference for individualized suspicion in its interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment and as a result, blanket policies such as these should not be
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.250
An individualized suspicion or at least a demonstrated problem in
the school district should be proven prior to implementing drug testing.
Such offerings of proof would most likely be sufficient to establish a
See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989).
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Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.
250
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 681.
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“compelling” government interest. The burden of proof should be on
the school district to show that there was a drug problem in the district
and it had exhausted its options in combating the problem prior to the
implementation of suspicionless drug testing.
V. CONCLUSION
With a little more Constitutional protection, well-behaved students
like Guy Good may not have to be subjected to such governmental
intrusion, and thus, would be more at ease in the school environment.
He would not have to sit in nervous anticipation of the next time he will
be called to have his privacy violated. His parents would also be assured
that their son was in the school’s custody without the threat of having
his liberty compromised.
Widespread drug use is undoubtedly a concern among school
administrators across the country. In addressing this concern, school
districts have implemented policies that threaten students’ privacy rights
and also instill the wrong message regarding what expectations all
Americans should have of the protections of the Constitution. The Court
has manipulated and avoided the language of the Fourth Amendment to
reach a result allowing for a diminished constitutional right of privacy
for students. This reach can be interpreted to extend to all students who
are not only enrolled in school, but are required to attend school due to
the state compulsory education laws.
The Court addressed several factors and applied them to a balancing
test, but made no consideration of parents’ fundamental right to control
the upbringing of their children. Student drug testing has been before
the Court twice in the past eleven years, and the Court has broadened
the scope of the power of school districts each time. Opposite this
broadening of power is the diminishing of our schoolchildren’s
constitutional rights. The Court should implement strict scrutiny and
consider parents in its balancing test before we rob future generations of
the constitutional privileges that define America.
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